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Abstract. The election of a leader in a network is a challenging task,
especially when the processes are asynchronous, i. e., execute an algo-
rithm with time-varying periods. Thales developed an industrial election
algorithm with an arbitrary number of processes, that can possibly fail.
In this work, we prove the correctness of a variant of this industrial al-
gorithm. We use a method combining abstraction, the SafeProver solver,
and a parametric timed model-checker. This allows us to prove the cor-
rectness of the algorithm for a large number p of processes (p = 5000).
Keywords: leader election, distributed algorithm, model checking, SaveProver,
parameterized verification, parametric timed automata
1 Introduction
Distributed systems, where entities communicate with each other, are boom-
ing in our societies. Drones communicating with each other, swarms of various
objects, intelligent cars. . . all may face communication and leadership issues.
Therefore, the algorithm that all entities execute should be verified. Thales de-
veloped an industrial election algorithm with an arbitrary number of processes,
that can possibly fail. We cannot describe the code of the actual algorithm for
confidentiality issues. Therefore, we consider a modified variant of the algorithm.
This algorithm focuses on the election of a leader in a distributed system with a
potentially large number of entities or nodes in an asynchronous environment.
⋆ This is the author version of the manuscript of the same name published in the
proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Verification, Model Checking,
and Abstract Interpretation (VMCAI 2019). This work is partially supported by In-
stitut Farman (ENS Paris-Saclay & CNRS), by the ANR national research program
PACS (ANR-14-CE28-0002) and by ERATO HASUOMetamathematics for Systems
Design Project (No. JPMJER1603), JST.
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Our main contribution is to perform a formal verification of the algorithm cor-
rectness for a large number of nodes. By correctness, we mean the actual election
of the leader after a fixed number of rounds.
We consider here a special form of the general leader election problem
[Lyn96]: we assume that, in the network, all the processes (or nodes) have a
specific ID number, and they execute the same code (symmetry) in order to
agree which ID number is the highest one. In the synchronous context where
all processes communicate simultaneously, the problem is often solved using the
“Bully algorithm” [GM82]. In the asynchronous context where each process com-
municates with a specific period possibly subject to delay variation (jitter), the
problem is much more difficult. Periods can be all slightly different from each
other, which makes the problem particularly complex. For example, a classical
distributed leader election protocol, where the nodes exchange data using broad-
casting, was designed by Leslie Lamport [Lam98] in the asynchronous context.
The correctness of this algorithm was proved mechanically many times using,
e. g., TLA+ tool [Lam02], or, more recently, using the timed model checking tool
Uppaal [BDL04]. However, these automated proofs work only for a small num-
ber p of processes, typically for p ≤ 10. In this paper, we present a technique to
prove the correctness of such a distributed leader election using automated tools
for a large number of nodes (e. g., p = 5000). The principle of the method relies
on the abstraction method consisting in viewing the network from the point of
view of a specific (but arbitrary) node, say nodei, and considering the rest of
the nodes of the network as an abstract environment interacting with nodei.
In this abstract model, two basic properties of the algorithm can be proven.
However, in order to prove the full correctness of the leader election algorithm,
we will need an auxiliary model, where some timing information is added to
(a raw form of) the abstract model. Using this auxiliary timed model, we are
able to prove an additional property of the leader election algorithm. Thanks to
the three aforementioned properties added as assumptions, we can then prove
the full correctness of the leader election algorithm, using the bounded model
checker SafeProver [E´J17] on the abstract model.
The leader election algorithm we use is not Lamport’s algorithm, but a simple
asynchronous form of the Bully algorithm. We consider a specific framework
of network structure and asynchronous form of communications. Basically, we
assume that:
1. the graph is complete (every node communicate with all the other ones).
2. the communications are instantaneous (the time between the sending of a
message and its reception is null), and the nodes exchange data via syn-
chronous one-way unconditional value passing.
3. the processes are visibly faulty, i. e., they always execute the generic code
of the algorithm, trying to elect the leader when they are non-faulty (mode
On), and do nothing when they are faulty (mode Off).
2
Relationship with Thales’ actual algorithm
As mentioned above, for confidentiality issue, we cannot reveal the original algo-
rithm developed at Thales. Nevertheless, it is in essence the same as the one we
present. Only the executed code has been modified. In addition, the technique
presented in this paper was designed for and applied to the original algorithm.
To summarize, we present exactly the methodology, up to the content of the
UpdateNode code (that is still similar in spirit).
After its verification using the techniques we present here, the original algo-
rithm has been implemented in C, and is nowadays running in one of the Thales
products. This product embeds a standard processor (in the line of Intel X86),
with some limited RAM, hard drive, Ethernet ports, etc.
Related work
The method proposed here makes use of several powerful techniques such as
counter abstraction, bounded model checking and parametric timed model check-
ing for verifying distributed fault-tolerant algorithms, similarly to what has been
recently described, e. g., in [KVW15]. As said in [KVW15]: “Symmetry allows
us to change representation into a counter representation (also referred to as
‘counter abstraction’): (...) Instead of recording which process is in which local
state, we record for each local state, how many processes are in this state. Thus,
we need one counter per local state ℓ, hence we have a fixed number of counters.
A step by a process that goes from local state ℓ to local state ℓ′ is modeled by
decrementing the counter associated with ℓ and incrementing the counter asso-
ciated with ℓ′. When the number p of processes is fixed, each counter is bounded
by p.” The work described in [KVW15] makes use of SMT solvers [DMB11] in
order to perform finite-state model checking of the abstracted model.
Our work can be seen as a new application of such techniques to (a variant
of) an industrial election algorithm. Another originality is to combine counter
abstraction, bounded model checking, with parametric timed model checking.
In an orthogonal direction, the verification of identical processes in a net-
work, i. e., a unknown number of nodes running the same algorithm, has
been studied in various settings, notably in the long line of work around
regular model checking [FO97,BJNT00], and in various settings in the timed
case [AJ03,ADR+11,ADR+16]. However, the focus of that latter series of works
is on decidability, and they do not consider real-world algorithms, nor do they
have tools implementing these results.
Finally, the line of works around the Cubicle model-checker
[CGK+12,CDZ17a,CDZ17b] performs parameterized verification of cache
memory protocols, that is also parameterized in the number of processes.
However, timing parameters are not present in these works.
Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the variant
of the leader election algorithm we consider. Section 3 presents our direct verifi-
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cation method for a small number of nodes. Section 4 presents our abstraction-
based verification for a much larger number of nodes. Section 5 concludes the
manuscript and outlines perspectives.
2 An asynchronous leader election algorithm
Thales recently proposed a leader election algorithm. This simple leader election
algorithm is based on the classical Bully algorithm originally designed for the
synchronous framework [GM82]. Basically, all nodes have an ID (all different),
and the node with the largest ID must be elected as a leader. This algorithm
is asynchronous. As usual, each node runs the same version of the code. We
cannot describe the code of the actual algorithm for confidentiality issues, and
we therefore consider and prove a modified variant of Thales’ original algorithm,
described throughout this section.
2.1 Periods, jitters, offset
The system is a fixed set of p nodes N = {node1, . . . , nodep}, for some p ∈ N.
Each node nodei is defined by:
1. its integer-valued ID nodei.id ∈ N,
2. its rational-valued activation period nodei.per ∈ [periodmin, periodmax],
3. its rational-valued first activation time nodei.start ∈ [0, nodei.per] (which
can be seen as an offset, with the usual assumption that the offset must be
less than or equal to the period), and
4. its rational-valued jitter values represent a delay variation for each period
belonging to [jittermin, jittermax], which is a static interval defined for all nodes
and known beforehand.
Observe that all periods are potentially different (even though they are all in
a fixed interval, and each of them remains constant over the entire execution),
which makes the problem particularly challenging. In contrast, the jitter is dif-
ferent at each period (this is the common definition of a jitter), and the jitter
of node i at the jth activation is denoted by jitterji . The jth activation of node
nodei therefore takes place at time t
j
i = t
j−1
i + nodei.per + jitter
j
i . We have
besides: t0i = nodei.start.
The concrete values for the static timing constants are given in Table 1.
Example 1. Assume the system is made of three nodes. Assume node1.per = 49.
Recall that a period is an arbitrary constant in a predefined interval. Assume
node1.start = 0.
Assume node2.per = 51 and node2.start = 30.
Assume node3.per = 49 and node3.start = 0.1.
Also assume the jitters for the first three activations of the nodes given in
Table 2.
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Table 1: Constants (in ms)
Constant Value
periodmin 49
periodmax 51
jittermin −0.5
jittermax 0.5
Table 2: Jitter values for Example 1
jitter1 jitter2 jitter3
Node 1 0.5 −0.5 0.5
Node 2 0 0.1 0
Node 3 0.1 0.3 0.5
We therefore have t01 = 0, t
1
1 = 49.5, t
2
1 = 97.5, t
3
1 = 147.5, t
0
2 = 30, t
1
2 = 81,
t22 = 132.1, t
3
2 = 183, t
0
3 = 0.1, t
1
3 = 48.6, t
2
3 = 98.4, t
3
3 = 147.6. The first
activations of the nodes are depicted in Fig. 1. Due to both uncertain periods
and the jitters, it can happen that, between two consecutive activations of a
node, another node may not be activated at all: for example, between t03 and t
1
3,
node 1 is never activated, and therefore node 3 will not receive a message from
node 1 during this interval. Conversely, between two consecutive activations of a
node, another node is activated twice: for example, between t13 and t
2
3, node 1 is
activated twice (i. e., t11 and t
2
1), and therefore node 3 may receive two messages
from node 1 during this interval.
Finally note that, in this example, the number of activations since the system
start for nodes 1 and 3 is always the same at any timestamp, up to a difference
of 1 (due to the jitters) because they have the same periods. In contrast, the
number of activations for node 2 will be smaller than that of nodes 1 and 3 by
an increasing difference, since node 2 is slower (period: 51 instead of 49). This
phenomenon does not occur when periods are equal for all nodes, and makes
this setting more challenging.
t
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
node1
node2
node3
t01 t
1
1 t
2
1 t
3
1
t02 t
1
2 t
2
2
t03 t
1
3 t
2
3 t
3
3
Fig. 1: Activation of three nodes with uncertain periods and jitters
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Remark 1. The rest of this paper assumes the constant values given in Table 1.
However, our method remains generic for constants of the same order of magni-
tude. Here, the variability of the periods is reasonably limited (around 4%). A
variability of more than 40% will endanger the soundness of our method, as our
upcoming assumption that between any three consecutive activations of a node,
all nodes execute at least once, would not hold anymore.
2.2 IDs, modes, messages
We assume that all the IDs of the nodes in the network are different. Each node
executes the same code. Each node has the ability to send messages to all the
nodes in the network, and can store (at least) one message received from any
other node in the network. Nodes are either in mode On and execute the code
at each activation time, or do nothing when they are in mode Off. (This models
the fact that some nodes in the network might fail.) A node in mode On is in
one of the following states:
– Follower: the node is not competing to become leader;
– Candidate: the node is competing to become leader;
– Leader: the node has declared itself to be the leader.
Each transmitted message is of the form: message = (SenderID, state) where
state is the state of the sending node.
2.3 The algorithm
At each new activation, nodei executes the code given in Algorithm 1. In short,
if the Boolean flag nodei.EvenActivation (which we can suppose being initially
arbitrary) is true, then the code line 1–line 15 is executed. In this code, the node
first reads its mailbox, and checks whether any message contains a higher node
ID than the node ID (line 3–line 7) and, if so, sets itself as a follower (line 6). If no
higher ID was received, the node “upgrades” its status from follower to candidate
(line 10), from candidate to leader (line 12), or remains leader if already leader
(line 14).
Finally (and this code is executed at every iteration), the node swaps the
Boolean flag EvenActivation (line 16), prepares a message with its ID and cur-
rent state (line 17) and sends this message to the entire network (line 18). We
assume that the Send To All Network function sends a message to all nodes—
including the sender.
We can see that the significant part of the code (line 1–line 15) is only exe-
cuted once every two activations (due to Boolean test nodei.EvenActivation).
This is enforced in order to ensure that each node executes the code after re-
ceiving at least one message from all the other nodes (in mode On). However,
note that each node sends a message at each iteration.
The order of magnitude of the constants in Table 1 gives the immediate
lemma.
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Algorithm 1: UpdateNode(i)
1 if nodei.EvenActivation then
2 allMessages← ReadMailbox()
3 higherIDreceived ← false
4 foreach message ∈ allMessages do
5 if message.SenderID > nodei.id then
6 statenext ← Follower
7 higherIDreceived ← true
8 if ¬ higherIDreceived then
9 if nodei.state = Follower then
10 statenext ← Candidate
11 else if nodei.state = Candidate then
12 statenext ← Leader
13 else if nodei.state = Leader then
14 statenext ← Leader
15 nodei.state← statenext
16 nodei.EvenActivation← ¬nodei.EvenActivation
17 message = {nodei.id;nodei.state}
18 Send To All Network(message)
Lemma 1. Assume a node i and activation times tji and t
j+2
i . Then in between
these two activations, node i received at least one message from all nodes.
Proof. From Table 1 and Algorithm 1.
Remark 2. For different orders of magnitudes, we may need to execute the code
once every more than two activations. For example, if we set jittermin = −25 and
jittermax = 25 in Table 1, the code should be executed every three activations for
our algorithm to remain correct.
2.4 Objective
We first introduce the following definitions.
Definition 1 (round). A round is a time period during which all the nodes
that are On have sent at least one message.
Definition 2 (cleanness). A round is said to be clean if during its time period
no node have been switched from On to Off or from Off to On.
The correctness property that we want to prove is:
“When, following a preliminary clean round, 4 new clean rounds
occur, the node with the highest ID is recognized as the leader by
all the nodes in modes On of the network.”
This property is denoted by (P) in the following.
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Remark 3 (fault model). Our model does allow for faults but, according to
Definition 2, only prior to the execution of the algorithm. That is, once it has
started, all nodes remain in On or Off during its entire execution. If in reality
there is a fault during the execution, it suffices to consider the execution of the
algorithm at the next clean round.
3 Direct verification of the leader election algorithm
In this section, we first verify our algorithm for a fixed number of processes.
We describe here the results obtained by SafeProver on a model M repre-
senting directly a network of a fixed, constant number of p processes (without
abstraction); for a small number p of nodes, we thus obtain a simple proof of the
correctness of the algorithm. The model includes explicitly a representation of
each node of N as well as their associated periods, first activation times, local
memories, and mailboxes of received messages. The code is given in Algorithm 2.
The mailbox is represented as a queue, initially filled with a message from one-
self.6
During the initialization declaration, we set everything as free variables (with
some constraints, e. g., on the periods) in order to have no assumptions on the
state of the network at the beginning. This ensures that this model is valid what-
ever happened in the past, and this can be seen as a symbolic initial state: this
notion of symbolic initial state was used to solve a challenge by Thales [SAL15],
also featuring uncertain periods. We also fully initialize the mailboxes of all the
nodes since we are assuming that we are right after a clean round. The variable
Activation is used as a variable to store how many times a node has been ex-
ecuted after the last clean round. The code of called function UpdateNode(i)
corresponds exactly to Algorithm 1.
The property (P) we want to prove is formalized as:(
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, Activation(i) ≥ 4
)
⇒(
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, j 6= maxId : nodej .state = Follower
∧ nodemaxId.state = Leader
)
with maxId = argmax({nodei.id | nodei.mode = On}i∈{1,...,p}). Using this
model and SafeProver [E´J17], we obtain the proof of (P) with the times tabulated
in Table 3.7 While this method allows us to formally prove the leader election
for up to 5 nodes, SafeProver times out for larger number of nodes. This leads us
to consider another method to prove the correctness of our algorithm for larger
numbers.
6 An initial empty mailbox would do as well but, in the actual Thales system, this is
the way the initialization is performed.
7 All the experiments reported in this paper have been run on a machine with two
Intel R© Xeon R© CPU E5-2430 at 2.5GHz, with 164GiB of RAM and running a
Debian 9 Linux distribution.
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Algorithm 2: SafeProver code for model M
1 Activation[1, . . . , p]← [0, . . . , 0]
// Network initialization
2 foreach i ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
3 nodei.id ∈ N
4 nodei.per ∈ [periodmin; periodmax]
5 nodei.start ∈ [0;nodei.per]
6 nodei.state ∈ {Follower,Candidate, Leader}
7 nodei.EvenActivation ∈ {true, false}
8 nodei.mode ∈ {On,Off}
9 nextActivationT ime(i)← nodei.start
// Mailboxes initializations
10 foreach i ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
// Arbitrary mailbox initialization with a message from oneself
11 nodei.mailbox← [(nodei.id, Follower)]
12 foreach i ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
13 foreach j ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
14 if nodej .mode = On then
15 nodei.mailbox.enqueue(messagej)
// Main algorithm
16 while true do
17 i← argmin(nextActivationT ime)
18 if nodei.mode = On then
19 UpdateNode(i)
20 Activation(i)← Activation(i) + 1
21 jitter ∈ [jittermin, jittermax]
22 nextActivationT ime(i)← nextActivationT ime(i) + nodei.per + jitter
4 Abstraction-based method
We now explain how to construct an abstract model M̂ of the original modelM .
This model M̂ clusters together all the p processes, except the process nodei
under study (where i is arbitrary, i. e., a free variable); M̂ also abstracts away
the timing information contained in M . We then use SaveProver to infer two
basic properties P1 and P2 for M̂ .
In a second phase, we consider an auxiliary simple (abstract) model T of M
which merely contains relevant timing information; we then use a parametric
timed model checker to infer a third property (P3) for T . The parametric timed
model checker is required due to the uncertain periods, that can have any value
in [periodmin, periodmax] but remain constant over the entire execution.
In the third phase, we consider again the model M̂ , and integrate P1–P3 to
SafeProver as assumptions, which allows us to infer a fourth property P4. The
properties P1 and P4 express together a statement equivalent to the desired cor-
rectness property P of the leader election algorithm. The advantage of reasoning
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Table 3: Computation times
Nodes Time (s)
p = 4 66.65
p = 5 215.61
p = 6 time out (> 3600)
All the other nodes
N \ {nodei}
nodei state
Messages
Fig. 2: Scheme of model M̂ with node i under study interacting with the cluster
of all the other nodes
with abstract models M̂ and T rather than directly to M , is to prove P for a
large number p of processes.
We now describe our method step by step in the following.
4.1 Abstract model M̂ and proof of P1-P2
The idea is to model the system as one node nodei (the node of interest) inter-
acting with the rest of the network: nodei receives messages from the other nodes
which are clustered into a single abstract process (see Fig. 2). In the abstract
model M̂ , each node can take any state at any activation, with no regards to
the parity (nodei.EvenActivation), what has been previously sent, what nodei
is sending. We only consider the activation of nodei. The rest of the network is
abstracted by the messages contained in the mailbox of nodei. Since we assume
that at least one clean round has passed, we always have a message from a work-
ing node in the mailbox. The code is given in Algorithm 3. (Note its analogy
with the SafeProver code of Algorithm 2 for M .) The first four lines define free
variables.
The list of assumptions that the solver can make on the messages received is
denoted by List of assumptions on messagej. This list is initially empty, and
augmented with “guarantees” (a.k.a. “proven properties”) on the other nodes as
they are iteratively generated by the solver. The first proven properties are:
– P1: (Activation(j) ≥ 2 ∧ nodej .id 6= maxId)⇒ nodej .state = Follower
– P2: (Activation(j) ≥ 2 ∧ nodej .id = maxId)
⇒ nodej .state ∈ {Candidate, Leader}
In these properties, j is a free variable: therefore, it is “fixed” among one execu-
tion, but can correspond to any of the node IDs. The two properties state that,
after two rounds, a node which has not the largest ID is necessarily a follower
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Algorithm 3: SafeProver code for abstract model M̂
1 Assume i ∈ {1, . . . , p}
2 Assume nodei.id ∈ N
3 Assume nodei.state ∈ {Follower,Candidate, Leader}
4 Assume nodei.EvenActivation ∈ {true, false}
5 Activation(i)← 0
6 while true do
7 for j ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
8 messagej ∈ {nodej .id} × {Follower,Candidate, Leader}
9 Assume: List of assumptions on messagej
10 nodei.mailbox.enqueue(messagej)
11 UpdateNode(i)
12 Activation(i) + +
13 Guarantee to prove
(P1), or a candidate or a leader if it has the largest ID (P2). As said before, P1
and P2 are then integrated to List of assumptions on messagej.
Guarantee to prove contains iteratively P1, then P1 and P2, then P1, P2
and P4.
4.2 Abstract model T and proof of P3
To represent the timed abstract model T of M , we use an extension of the for-
malism of timed automata [AD94], a powerful extension of finite-state automata
with clocks, i. e., real-valued variables that evolve at the same time. These clocks
can be compared with constants when taking a transition (“guards”), or to re-
main in a discrete state (“invariants”). Discrete states are called locations. Timed
automata were proven successful in verifying many systems with interactions be-
tween time and concurrency, especially with the state-of-the-art model-checker
Uppaal [BDL04]. However, timed automata cannot model and verify arbitrary
periods: while it is possible to model a different period at each round, it is not
possible to first fix a period once for all (in an interval), and then use this period
for the rest of the execution. We therefore use the extension “parametric timed
automata” [AHV93,And19] allowing to consider parameters, i. e., unknown con-
stants (possibly in an interval). IMITATOR [AFKS12] is a state-of-the-art model
checker supporting this formalism.
In our method, the timed abstract model T of M is a product of two similar
parametric timed automata representing the node i under study and a generic
node j belonging to N \ {i} respectively. Each parametric timed automaton
contains a single location. The parametric timed automaton corresponding to
nodei uses an activation period peri that we model as a parameter. Indeed,
recall that the period belongs to an interval: taking a value in the interval at each
round would not be correct, as the period would not be constant. This is where
we need parameters in our method. In addition, we constrain this parameter
11
nodei
ci ≤ peri + jittermax
Activation(i) := 0
0 ≤ ci ≤ peri + jittermax
ci ≥ peri + jittermin
Activation(i) := Activation(i) + 1
Fig. 3: Component 1 of timed model T
peri to belong to [periodmin, periodmax]. Each automaton has its own clock ci that
is used to measure how much time has passed since the last activation. Each
automaton has a discrete variable8 Activation(i) which is initialized at 0 and is
used to count the number of activations for this node. We give the constraint on
ci at the beginning that ci ∈ [0, peri+ jittermax]. An activation can occur as soon
as ci reaches peri + jittermin. This is modeled by the guard ci ≥ peri + jittermin
on the transition that resets ci and increment Activation(i). An activation can
occur as long as ci is below or equal to peri + jittermax. This is modeled by the
invariant ci ≤ peri + jittermin on the unique location of the automaton. This
invariant forces the transition to occur when ci reaches its upper bound. This
parametric timed automaton is represented in Fig. 3.9 The other component
representing the cluster of the rest of the nodes is modeled similarly as a generic
component nodej .
For nodes nodei and nodej, the property that we want to specify corresponds
in the direct model M (without abstraction) of Section 3 to:
– (Activation(i) ≤ 13 ∧ Activation(j) ≤ 13)
⇒ | Activation(i)−Activation(j) | ≤ 2.
In our timed abstract model T , such a property becomes:
– (P3): ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , p} Activation(j) ≤ 13⇒
−2 ≤ Activation(j)−Activation(i) ≤ 1.
where Activation(i) denotes the number of activations of node i since the last
clean round.
The value “13” has been obtained experimentally: smaller numbers led the
algorithm to fail (the property was not satisfied). Intuitively, it consists in the
number of activations by which we are sure the leader will eventually be elected.
The proof of P3 is obtained by adding to the model an observer10 automaton
checking the value of the discrete variables Activation(i) and Activation(j),
8 Discrete variables are global Boolean- or integer-valued variables, that can be read
or written in transition guards. If their domain is finite they are syntactic sugar for
a larger number of locations.
9 The color code is that of IMITATOR automated LATEX outputs: clocks are in blue,
parameters in orange, and discrete variables in pink.
10 An observer is an additional automaton that can synchronize with the system (us-
ing synchronized actions, clocks or discrete variables values), without modifying its
behavior nor blocking it. See e. g., [ABBL98,And13].
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Table 4: Computation times
Nodes Time (s)
p = 500 13.34
p = 1000 45.95
p = 5000 623.46
which goes to a bad location when the property is violated. The property is
then verified by showing that the bad location is not reachable. For the values
of the timing constants in Table 1, IMITATOR proves P3 (by showing the non-
reachability of the bad location) in 12 s. Recall that, thanks to our assumption on
the number of nodes, we only used two nodes in the input model for IMITATOR.
In the next part, we show how the addition of P3 as an assumption in the
original abstract model allows to prove the desired property P for a large number
of nodes.
4.3 Proof of P using P1–P3 as assumptions
In addition to P1-P2, we now put P3 (Activation(j) ∈ [Activation(i) −
1;Activation(i)+2]) as an element of List of assumptions on messagej used in
the SafeProver code of M̂ (see Algorithm 3). SafeProver is then able to generate
the following property:
P4 : (Activation(i) ≥ 4 ∧ nodei.id = maxId)⇒ nodei.state = Leader
Property P4 states that the node with the highest ID will declare itself as Leader
after at most 4 activations. Besides, property P1 states that a node, not having
the highest ID, is in the state Follower within at most 2 activations. Proper-
ties P1 and P4 together thus express a statement equivalent to the desired cor-
rectness property P. The global generation of properties (P1), (P2) and (P4) by
SafeProver takes the computation times tabulated in Table 4. As one sees, the
computation time is now smaller by an order of magnitude than the ones given
in Table 3, thus showing the good scalability of our method.
Remark 4. Note that verifying the model for 5,000 nodes also gives a guarantee
for any smaller of nodes. Indeed, we can assume that an arbitrary number of
nodes are in mode Off, and remain so, which is equivalent to a smaller number
of nodes.
4.4 Discussion
Soundness We briefly discuss the soundness of the algorithm. First, note that the
assumptions used above have been validated by the system designers (i. e., those
who designed the algorithm). Second, SafeProver validated the assumptions, i. e.,
proved that they were not inconsistent with each other (which would result in
an empty model).
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Now, the abstraction used in Section 4.2, i. e., to consider only two nodes, is
the one which required most human creativity. Let us briefly discuss its sound-
ness. Our abstraction allows to model the sending of any message, which includes
the actual message to be sent in the actual system. The fact that a message was
necessarily received in the actual system between two (real) executions of the
node under study is given by the fact that all nodes necessarily execute at least
once in the last two periods (see Lemma 1). Of course, this soundness is only
valid under our own assumptions on the variability of the period, considering
the constants in Table 1: if the period of one node is 1 while the other is 100,
our framework is obviously not sound anymore.
Parametric vs. parametrized model checking As shown in Table 4, we verified
the model for a constant number of nodes. This comes in contrast with the
recent work on parameterized verification (e. g., [ADR+16,CDZ17a,CDZ17b]).
However, while these latter consider a parameterized number of nodes, they
consider non-parametric timed models; in contrast, we need here parametric
timed models to be able to represent the uncertainty on the periods. Combining
both worlds (parameterized number of nodes with parametric timed models)
would be of interest—but remains a very challenging objective.
5 Conclusion
We described a method combining abstraction, SafeProver and parametric timed
model-checking in order to prove the correctness of a variant of an asynchronous
leader election algorithm designed by Thales. Our approach can efficiently verify
the leader election after a fixed number of rounds for a large number p of pro-
cesses (up to p = 5000). The method relies on the construction of two abstract
models M̂ and T of the original model M . Although it is intuitive, it could be
interesting to prove formally that each abstraction is correct in the sense that it
over-approximates all the behaviors of M .
Perspectives
Many variants of the algorithm can be envisioned (loss of messages, non-
instantaneous transmission, non-complete graph topology, . . . ). The fault model
could also be enriched. It will then be also interesting to propose extensions of
our abstraction-based method to prove the correctness of such extensions.
The correctness of the method relies on the order of magnitude of the con-
stants used (Remark 1). For different intervals, it might be necessary to both
adapt the algorithm (read messages only every k activations) but also the as-
sumptions used in the proof using abstraction, a manual and possibly error-prone
process. A more general verification method would be desirable.
In addition, the number of activations in our correctness property (“after 13
activations, the leader is elected”) was obtained using an incremental verification
(values of up to 12 all gave concrete counterexamples). As a future work, we
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would like to automatically infer this value too, i. e., obtaining the minimal
value of activations before a leader is guaranteed to be elected.
Finally, adding probabilities to model the fault of nodes will be of interest.
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